

## Message Text

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ACTION ARA-10

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-----061422Z 047113 /53

O 061135Z MAY 77  
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1476  
INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: OVIP, BR (TODMAN, TERENCE A)  
SUBJ: POSSIBLE PRESS QUESTIONS FOR TODMAN VISIT

REF: BRASILIA 3340

FOLLOWING IS OUR ESTIMATE OF THE PRESS QUESTIONS MOST LIKELY  
TO COME UP DURING ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE  
AND AT ENCOUNTERS WITH REPORTERS AT AIRPORTS AND  
DURING CALLS:

1. GENERAL POLITICAL  
--WHY HAS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY COME TO BRAZIL? DOES  
HE HAVE A SPECIFIC MESSAGE FROM WASHINGTON FOR THE BRAZILIAN  
GOVERNMENT OR HAS HE COME TO NEGOTIATE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES  
SUCH AS THE NUCLEAR ISSUE?  
--WHEN WILL SECRETARY VANCE VISIT HERE? HAS MR. TODMAN  
COME TO PREPARE FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT OR SET A DATE FOR  
IT?  
--WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP OF MR. TODMAN'S VISIT TO  
THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS UNDER THE MOU? DOES MR. TODMAN  
PLAN TO DISCUSS THE RESUMPTION OF REGULAR CONSULTATIONS  
UNDER THE MOU? OR IS THE MOU A DEAD LETTER?  
--DOES THE FACT THAT THE US HAS SHOWN SO LITTLE  
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INTEREST IN CONTINUING THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS  
INDICATE THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION HAS SHIFTED  
ITS PRIORITY FOR SPECIAL CONCERN IN LATIN AMERICA FROM  
BRAZIL TO MEXICO, SINCE WE NOTE THAT THE MEXICAN  
PRESIDENT WAS THE FIRST CHIEF OF STATE TO VISIT  
PRESIDENT CARTER.  
--NOW THAT THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION IS WELL

ESTABLISHED, WILL IT BE SENDING A NEW AMBASSADOR TO BRAZIL?

--DOES THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARE TO COMMENT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS ADOPTED BY PRESIDENT GEISEL IN APRIL? DOES HE CONSIDER THESE REFORMS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC? IF SO, WILL THEY MAKE US RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL MORE DIFFICULT?

--DID PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER TO GENERAL GEISEL, WHICH WAS DELIVERED MARCH 29 ON THE EVE OF THE REFORMS, MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO UNDO THE DAMAGE TO US-BRAZIL RELATIONS CAUSED BY THE RELEASE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT? WAS THE LETTER IN FACT AN APOLOGY TO PRESIDENT GEISEL FOR THE US HANDLING OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION AS IS OFTEN RUMORED HERE?

--WHY DID PRESIDENT CARTER CHOOSE TO SEND PRESIDENT GEISEL A LETTER, WHICH WAS APPARENTLY INTENDED TO REAFFIRM A CLOSE PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP, AT A TIME WHEN THE PRESIDENT WAS PREPARING TO CLOSE THE CONGRESS AND ADOPT ANTI-DEMOCRATIC REFORMS? HOW CAN SUCH AN ACTION BE SEEN AS CONSISTENT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS?

--IN THE SAME VEIN, WILL MRS. CARTER BE COMING TO BRAZIL? IF SO, WHY IS SHE COMING TO BRAZIL AT THIS TIME? WHAT ARE THE SUBJECTS SHE WILL DISCUSS WITH BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS? DOES HER VISIT AT THIS TIME SIGNIFY THAT THE US HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC REFORMS ADOPTED IN APRIL?

--HOW POPULAR IS PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY IN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THE US? HAS THE ADVERSE REACTION IN BRAZIL AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO HIS HUMAN RIGHTS POSITION IMPAIRED HIS POPULARITY?

--IN VIEW OF BRAZIL'S REJECTION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ITS ABROGATION OF THE 1952 MUTUAL SECURITY AGREEMENT, WILL THE US MAINTAIN ITS MILITARY MISSION IN BRAZIL? IF SO, FOR WHAT PURPOSE AND HOW WILL IT JUSTIFY ITS EXISTENCE TO CONGRESS? WILL THE MISSION BE KEPT BUT REDUCED IN SIZE?

--WHAT IS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF MILITARY ADVISORY GROUPS AND YOUR CHOICE OF BOLIVIA, ARGENTINA, COLOMBIA, VENEZUELA AND BRAZIL (ALL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN NAMED TO HAVE THEIR MAAG'S ELIMINATED) FOR YOUR FIRST VISIT TO LATIN AMERICA?

## 2. HUMAN RIGHTS

-- IF THE (PROPOSED) HARKINS-BADILLO AMENDMENT REGARDING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IS ENACTED INTO

LAW, HOW WILL THE US DEAL WITH BRAZILIAN APPLICATIONS  
FOR LOANS FROM IFI'S?

--IS THERE CONCERN IN THE US THAT THE RENUNCIATION BY  
SUCH COUNTRIES AS BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA OF SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE WILL ULTIMATELY WEAKEN US SECURITY INTERESTS  
IN THE SOUTHERN CONE AND THE SOUTH ATLANTIC? IS THE  
US SEEKING WAYS TO CONTINUE SOME FROM OF SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE TO THOSE COUNTRIES IN SPITE OF THE RENUNCIATION?  
--IS IT TRUE THAT US MILITARY STRATEGISTS ARE  
DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE EFFECTS OF THESE US POLICIES ON  
US MILITARY LINKS TO BRAZIL AND OTHER YUVJOPQULDIES?  
--IS THE US CONSIDERING MEANS OF RESISTING THE FLOW  
OF INVESTMENT OR LOANS BY PRIVATE FIRMS OR BANKS TO  
COUNTRIES WHOSE HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE IS "SUBSTANDARD"?  
--RECENT STATEMENTS BY YOU AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS  
OF THE US GOVERNMENT SUGGEST TTAT THE US IS MOVING TOWARD A

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SOFTER, LESS DOCTRINAIRE, LINE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, IS  
THIS CORRECT? IS THIS A RESULT OF THE STRONG  
RESISTANCE BY BRAZIL AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES?  
HOW HAS THE US POSITION EVOLVED AND WHERE DO HUMAN RIGHTS  
FIT AMONG US INTERNATIONAL PRIORITIES NOW?  
--DO YO SHARE AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S BELIEF AS STATED IN  
HIS ADDRESS TO ECLA, MAY 4, THAT SOCIAL JUSTICE AND  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ARE INEXTRICABLE? IF SO, HOW  
SPECIFICALLY WILL THIS BE DEMONSTRATED IN USG ECONOMIC  
POLICIES AFFECTING LATIN AMERICA?  
--HOW WOULD YOU CONTRAST FREEDOM OF THE NEWS MEDIA IN  
YOUR COUNTRY WITH OUR FREEDOM HERE IN BRAZIL?

3. NUCLEAR

--DOES PRESIDENT CARTER'S MAY 2 STATEMENT TO EUROPEAN JOURNALISTS--"WE ARE NOT GOING TO TRY TO IMPOSE OUR WILL ON OTHER COUNTRIES..."--MEAN THAT THE US IS GIVING UP ON ITS PRESSURES AGAINST THE REPROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT PARTS OF THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN AGREEMENT?  
--IF SO, WHAT IS THE PRACTICAL MEANING FOR BRAZIL OF THE PRESIDENT'S AFFIRMATION THAT THE US STILL OBJECTS TO THE AGREEMENT? AND WHY DID CARTER CHANGE HIS MIND--WAS IT BECAUSE OF THE LARGELY NEGATIVE WORLD REACTION TO HIS APRIL 7 STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR POLICY?  
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--WILL THE US COOPERATE WITH BRAZIL IN NUCLEAR ENERGY? WILL THE US MAKE GOOD ON THE ANGRA I FUEL CONTRACT?  
--HOW MUCH HAS THE NUCLEAR ISSUE HURT US-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS? WILL THIS ISSUE CONTINUE TO BE THE MAJOR IRRITANT IN OUR RELATIONS? WILL RELATIONS IMPROVE NOW THAT THE US IS NOT GOING TO TRY TO IMPOSE ITS WILL ON THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN AGREEMENT?  
--DOES CARTER'S NEW NUCLEAR POSITION MEAN THAT THE US HAS ACCEPTED THE INEVITABILITY OF BRAZIL'S RISE TO GREAT POWER STATUS?  
--WEREN'T US CONCERNS ABOUT THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN AGREEMENT REALLY BASED ON COMMERCIAL MOTIVES?  
--WHAT IS YOUR VIEW ON THE TLAELOLCO TREATY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR NON-PROLIFERATION IN LATIN AMERICA?  
--HOW CAN THE US SEEK TO CONTROL HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION WHEN THE SUPERPOWERS CONTINUE THEIR ARMS RACE?  
--DOES THE US WANT BRAZIL TO ADHERE TO THE NPT? HASN'T CARTER'S NUCLEAR POLICY UNDERCUT THE NPT? IS THE NPT OUTDATED AND INEFFECTIVE? WILL THE US WORK WITH BRAZIL TO NEGOTIATE A MODIFIED NPT WHICH BRAZIL CAN ACCEPT?

#### 4. COMMERCIAL POLICY

--DESPITE PRESIDENT CARTER'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS AFFIRMING HIS COMMITMENT TO FREE INTERNATIONAL TRADE, MANY BRAZILIAN EXPORTS TO THE US ARE STILL SUBJECT TO A VARIETY OF RESTRICTIVE MEASURES, THUS HELPING TO MAINTAIN THE US SURPLUS IN BILATERAL TRADE. HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THIS DISCREPANCY?  
--DOES THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION INTEND TO INFUSE ITS TRADE POLICIES WITH THE CONCEPT OF THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS?  
--ALTHOUGH THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION DID NOT ACCEPT THE ITC'S RECOMMENDATION TO IMPOSE QUOTAS/TARIFFS ON SHOE IMPORTS, HOW CAN OUR INDUSTRIES BE ASSURED THAT  
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FUTURE RESTRICTIONS WILL NOT BE IMPOSED ON SHOES OR  
OTHER PRODUCTS?

--IS THE USG PREPARING INVESTIGATIONS OF OTHER  
BRAZILIAN EXPORTS TO THE US?

5. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS

--DOES THE ADMINISTRATION AGREE WITH ARTHUR BURNS, CHAIR-  
AN OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, THAT AMERICAN BANKS ARE OVER-  
EXTENDED IN THEIR LENDING TO NON-OIL EXPORTING DEVELOPING  
COUNTRIES? IS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ABOUT TO  
PLACE A LIMIT ON US BANK LENDING ABROAD?

--HOW DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT VIEW THE  
CURRENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES OF BRAZIL AND THE MEASURES  
ADOPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR DEALING WITH THEM?

--DESPITE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN FINANCE MINISTER  
SIMONSEN AND FORMER SECRETARY OF TREASURY SIMON LAST  
MAY TO EXPEDITE NEGOTIATIONS ON A BILATERAL TAX  
TREATY NOTHING SEEMS TO HAVE HAPPENED IN THE LAST TWELVE  
MONTHS. WHY IS THAT?

6. COMMODITIES

--WHY DOES THE US NOT SUPPORT THE UNCTAD COMMON  
FUND PROPOSAL?

--WHY DOES THE US DIFFER FROM ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS  
ON COMMODITY STABILIZATION PLANS IN GENERAL AND ON THE  
COMMON FUND IN PARTICULAR?

--DO YOU SEE PROSPECTS FOR G-8 COMPROMISES IN CIEC  
LEADING TO THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF CIEC?

--HOW CAN THE US CONGRESS (I.E. RICHMOND) TAKE A  
POSITION ON COFFEE OPPOSED TO THE OFFICIAL USG  
POSITION AS EXPRESSED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY KATZ?

--WHAT DO YOU THINK OF CHARGES THAT THE BRAZILIANS  
ARE MANIPULATING THE COFFEE MARKET? ARE SUCH CHARGES STILL  
WIDELY BELIEVED IN THE US AND DO THEY REMAIN A PROBLEM  
IN OUR RELATIONS?

--HOW CAN YOU JUSTIFY USG SUPPORT FOR A CONSUMER  
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COFFEE BOYCOTT (I.E., PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT ON  
DRINKING TEA)?

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--WHAT DO YOU THINK THE CHANCES ARE FOR THE NEGOTIATION  
OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL SUGAR AGREEMENT SATISFACTORY TO  
BOTH EXPORTERS AND CONSUMERS?  
--WHY DOES THE US NOT LIMIT THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL  
SUGAR SUBSTITUTES TO INCREASE THE MARKET FOR NATURAL  
SUGAR?  
--IS IT LIKELY THAT THE US WILL JOIN THE INTERNATIONAL  
CACAO ORGANIZATION? WHY OR WHY NOT?  
--WHAT ARE THE PROBABILITIES OF A US SOY EXPORT  
EMBARGO?  
--WHY DOES THE US CONTINUE TO HAVE BUMPER CROPS  
OF SOY BEANS WHEN LDCS ARE TRYING TO INCREASE THEIR  
PRODUCTION IN THIS AREA?

7. MINERALS

--WHY DID US STEEL DROP OUT OF THE CARAJAS IRON ORE  
PROJECT? WHAT IS THE US GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THIS  
ISSUE?

8. REGIONAL OR HEMISPHERIC QUESTIONS

--IS THE US SEEKING TO "NORMALIZE" ITS RELATIONS WITH  
CUBA? WILL THIS PROCESS GO FORWARD EVEN THOUGH HUMAN  
RIGHTS PRACTICES IN CUBA ARE SUBSTANDARD AND CUBAN  
TROOPS REMAIN IN ANGOLA?

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--WHAT IS THE US POSITION ON THE POINT AT ISSUE  
IN THE BRAZIL-ARGENTINE DISPUTE OVER DEVELOPMENT OF  
THE PARANA RIVER? DOES THE US BELIEVE THAT UP-STREAM  
STATES PLANNING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS THAT AFFECT  
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO CONSULT

WITH DOWN-STREAM STATES?

--NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND PANAMA RESUMED  
ON MAY 9; WHAT ARE THE CHANCES OF A SETTLEMENT BEFORE  
THE END OF THE FIRST CARTER ADMINISTRATION? WHAT ARE  
THE CHIEF ISSUES BLOCKING A SETTLEMENT? IF NO  
SETTLEMENT IS REACHED, WHAT WILL BE THE IMPACT OF THE  
IMPASSE ON US RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND WITH  
BRAZIL IN PARTICULAR?  
--WHAT IS THE US DOING TO AID IN ACHIEVING SETTLE-  
MENT OF THE DISPUTE AMONG PERU, BOLIVIA, AND CHILE REGARDING  
BOLIVIA'S DESIRE FOR AN ACCESS TO THE SEA?  
--DOES THE US CONSIDER THE BUILD UP OF SOVIET ARMS  
IN PERU A THREAT TO REGIONAL SECURITY OR STABILITY?  
DOES THE US CONTINUE TO BE UNINTERESTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF A SOUTH ATLANTIC ARRANGEMENT TO PROTECT THE AREA  
AGAINST SOVIET ENCROACHMENT? WHY HAS THE US NOT SHOWN  
MORE INTEREST IN SUPPORTING A REGIONAL COLLECTIVE EFFORT  
TO RESIST SOVIET PENETRATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC?

9. ASSISTANT SECRETARY COULD REASONABLY EXPECT  
OTHER QUESTIONS RANGING OVER GAMUT OF US FOREIGN RELATIONS  
IN AREAS OUTSIDE OF HEMISPHERE. BRAZILIAN PRESS IN  
PAST HAS SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN ASKING US OFFICIALS  
ABOUT US POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST,  
WESTERN EUROPE, NATO AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND ON SUCH  
FUNCTIONAL ISSUES AS PETROLEUM, LAW OF THE SEA, TERRORISM  
AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

10. FOR PRESS CONFERENCE, WHICH WE NOW TENTATIVELY  
PLAN TO HOLD AT EMBASSY IN LATE AFTERNOON, EMBASSY  
SUGGESTS THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY PLAN TO RESPOND TO  
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QUESTION IN ENGLISH. EMBASSY WILL PROVIDE ENGLISH-  
PORTUGUESE INTERPRETERS.  
CRIMMINS

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